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CONTRACTS, CASES AND DOCTRINE. By Randy E. Barnett.f
Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. Pp.
xxxix, 1309.
Reviewed by Michael B. Kelly*
On my shelf, I count nineteen different casebooks covering
contracts, not counting older editions or multiple versions of a book.
The doctrines they introduce, primarily to first-year students, differ
very little. The Uniform Commercial Code does not differ from text
to text, though the extent the authors advert to it varies. The common
law doctrines do not differ significantly, though the cases chosen to
illustrate them vary, as does the extent of reliance on the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts as a summary of those doctrines. Consideration
and reliance, material breach and repudiation, duress and fraud,
expectation, and reliance and restitution interests all emerge from every
text. The subjects appear in different orders. The cases differ
(sometimes). But on the whole, every book treats the same basic
components of the law--components that have not changed much in
the last ten years, no matter what the publishers of new editions may
want us to think.
The wealth of available materials drives authors to distinguish
their casebooks from the rest of the pack. Some books choose new
formats, such as McKinnon's looseleaf approach' or the newly arrived
electronic casebooks.' Some explore a particular theoretical approach
to contract law, such as Scott & Leslie's focus on law and economics3
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1. MATTHEW C. MCKINNON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1993).
2. The electronic version of Barnett's casebook arrived the day I submitted this review. I
do not have enough experience with it to venture comments at this time.
3. ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY (2d ed.
1993).
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and MacNeil's focus on a relational theory of contract law.' Some
seek to organize the material differently, such as Dawson, Harvey &
Henderson's innovation putting remedies at the beginning of the
book,' an approach others now follow.6
In the quest for novelty, I fear that one vital component has
received less emphasis than it deserves: pedagogy. I do not mean to
imply that authors pay no attention to pedagogy. On the contrary, I
suspect every author has some pedagogical purpose that motivates, at
least in part, the creation of new materials. But often those pedagogi-
cal purposes misfire in execution. Among other problems, lack of
training in education may undermine good intentions, pedagogical
idiosyncrasies may emerge, other purposes may interfere with
pedagogical goals, or collaborations (contemporaneous or posthumous)
may produce mixed pedagogical messages. These difficulties do not
destroy the substance of the contract law presented in the texts. But
the materials chosen often do not facilitate teaching first-year students.
Randy Barnett's Contracts, Cases and Doctrine7 surmounts these
difficulties. It presents a relatively straightforward set of teaching
materials, aptly chosen for modem teaching techniques. Careful
exposition of fundamentals permits professors to use class time more
productively. The concentration on fundamentals also frees the
professor to choose the specific elaborations she finds most valuable for
the class or the material.
I. DESCRIPTION
Barnett's casebook is longer than many: 1292 pages, excluding
tables and indices, but including a short (eight page) introduction.'
The length results, at least in part, from the inclusion of material other
texts sometimes omit. Some of the material is optional. Agency and
tortious interference with contract are not essential to understanding
contract law, but they can be important additions if other courses no
longer cover these topics. In other sections, Barnett offers an
opportunity to explore a doctrine in more depth than other casebooks
typically do. The choices of topics naturally reflect Barnett's interests:
4. IAN R. MACNEIL, EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS (2d ed. 1978); see also
STEWART MACAULAY, ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (1995).
5. JOHN P. DAWSON, ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT (6th ed. 1993).
6. See, e.g., MAcCAULAY ET AL., supra note 4.
7. RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS, CASES AND DOCTRINE (1995).
8. The material teaches more quickly than the page count might suggest. I covered 1,150
of those pages-400 more than I had ever covered with the text I used before Barnett. Both texts
were used in a six credit, two semester course.
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using injunctions to enforce personal service contracts (five cases, two
case excerpts, forty-three pages total) and using intention to be legally
bound to decide which contracts to enforce (Chapter Ten, seventy-five
pages, in addition to references in three other chapters covering
consideration and reliance). The topics themselves may not require
coverage this extensive. But extensive materials draw students beneath
the surface of these topics. In this way, the casebook helps professors
reveal some of the complexity underlying judicial opinions. Barnett
injects the same opportunities in other, less-extensively covered topics
by giving students more of the opinion, an opinion following remand,
excerpts from articles on the context of the dispute, or one more case
than is common in other texts.9 Barnett uses the additional pages to
good purpose.
The organization is well considered, though not entirely conven-
tional. The basic structure begins with remedies, then proceeds
through assent, enforceability (consideration), performance and breach,
and concludes with contract defenses. Barnett makes several interest-
ing judgments in placing subjects within this framework. Public policy
limits on the enforceability of promises appear in the introductory
chapter, not the section on defenses. Interpretation appears in the
section on assent, drawing parallels between the existence of an
agreement and the meaning of the agreed terms. Multiparty contracts
(third party beneficiaries, assignment, delegation, and agency) also
appear in this section, rather than being tacked on at the end of the
book. Barnett devotes extensive coverage (four chapters) to consider-
ation, beginning with a chapter on the theoretical underpinnings,
followed by more traditional chapters on consideration and reliance
surrounding a chapter entitled "The Intention To Be Legally Bound."
The chapters on performance and breach cover the traditional topics:
good faith, warranties, prospective nonperformance, material breach
and substantial performance. The chapters on defenses are divided
into capacity, improper means (fraud, duress, undue influence, and
unconscionability), and failure of basic assumptions (mistake, impracti-
cability, and frustration).
Each unit (with a few exceptions) proceeds in a standard format.
Barnett introduces each case or article with study questions, things for
students to consider as they read the selection. The cases themselves
9. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 7, at 440-450 (excerpts from discussions in Grant
Gilmore, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT, 35-41 (1974) and A.W.B. Simpson, Contracts for Cotton
to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 287 (1989)); Id. at 697-98
(opinion of Alabama Supreme Court denying review of Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 199 (Ala.
1936)).
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are presented with only occasional notes or comments at the end.
After two or three readings (often including an article providing
contextual material), Barnett quotes pertinent sections of the Uniform
Commercial Code or the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, some-
times with comments or illustrations. The frequent inclusion of the
Uniform Commercial Code makes it easy to incorporate that material
into the basic course on contracts. References to three major horn-
books conclude each section.10
The case selection emphasizes the classics, though modem
developments are thoroughly represented. Barnett reveals the origins
of most doctrines, sometimes with excerpts from scholarly works, but
often with the leading cases. The historical flow of the law emerges
clearly from the materials. The cases are uniformly well edited and
well chosen.
Barnett also prepared a thorough teaching manual for use with the
casebook. It contains complete lesson plans for every unit in the text
and for many portions of the companion volume, Perspectives on
Contract Law. " The lesson plans are in outline form, usually
beginning with a question and exploring the expected answers. The
teaching manual is available on disk for those who want to import
these outlines to their word processing program and edit them for use
in class.
II. PEDAGOGICAL VALUE
Barnett's materials offer a number of pedagogical advantages over
other materials. The structure of the materials facilitates the produc-
tive use of class time. The absence of clutter empowers professors to
direct their course along avenues they find most valuable. In
discussing these two qualities, I find a third point emerges. The depth
of materials makes it harder for students to treat the law at a superficial
level. While not discussed separately, this aspect of the book deserves
note.
By including excerpts from the UCC and the Restatement in
almost every section, Barnett frees class time to explore the use of or
the rationale for the existing rules. The book does not ask students to
10. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1990); JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH
M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1987); JOHN E. MURRAY, MURRAY ON
CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1990).
11. RANDY E. BARNETT, PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT LAW (1995) [hereinafter
BARNETT, PERSPECTIVES]. This work provides extensive excerpts from law review articles,
designed to explore the rationales for the doctrines covered in the casebook-any contracts
casebook, not just Barnett's.
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try to discern the prevailing rule from a sequence of judicial opinions.
Rather, it lays rules out and illustrates their application with cases.
Students come to class with a better grasp of the fundamentals. This
frees the professor to explore the nuances of the material. Class time
can be devoted to honing more important skills: the ability to apply the
rule to different situations, the ability to evaluate normative justifica-
tions for the rule, and the ability to frame arguments that might
produce better rules or exceptions in subsequent litigation.
Some professors may not see this as an advantage. The presence
of the UCC or Restatement will not aid professors who want to focus
their course on common-law induction--deriving rules from an array
of cases. (Barnett's decision to put these excerpts at the end of each
unit will not keep students from reading the rule before the professor
can tease it out in class.) But then, very few casebooks today are well
suited for this technique. 2 Some casebooks reduce student exposure
to excerpts from the UCC or the Restatement (or even cases that quote
them). 3  But they rarely contain enough different cases (even
counting note cases) to give students sufficient data points from which
to induce the law. 4
12. Dawson's casebook strikes me as a perfect example of this pedagogical approach.
DAWSON ET AL., supra note 5. Its extensive use of note cases packed with variations or even
contradictions of principal cases offers a wealth of opportunities for distinguishing cases and
explaining which facts caused the variations. My limited knowledge of Kessler, Gilmore &
Kronman suggests it belongs to the same genre. FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1986).
13. For example, in Chapter 4 (Policing the Bargain) of Farnsworth & Young, citations to
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts are relatively rare, let alone quotations of the rules
presented in the Restatement. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG,
CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 324-482 (5th ed. 1995). References to the UCC are more
common, but require students to fird the text in a supplement in order to evaluate summaries of
the rule or questions concerning how it would apply to particular cases. The chapter on contract
defenses in MCKINNON, supra note 1, is similarly sparing in citation to the Restatement.
Students can surmount these difficulties, if professors demand that students read all pertinent
provisions of the UCC and the Restatement before class. By making the provisions part of the
text, Barnett makes it more likely that students will meet this demand.
14. Induction requires more than one or two bits of data. Students can appreciate the
importance of variations on the facts only if cases (or at least hypotheticals) present a sufficient
array of situations in which the new facts take on importance. Fewer cases would suffice for a
doctrine where courts produced uniform results across an array of factual situations. Factual
nuances would not produce different results, so there would be no purpose in studying the facts
that might lead a court to vary the outcome. Such bright-line rules are relatively rare today, at
least in common-law decisions. Where they exist, they offer little reason for extended study,
particularly if a professor's objective is to teach the techniques of common-law induction.
Students are unlikely to learn sensitivity to subtle variations of facts in a context where courts
attach no weight to these differences.
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The dearth of casebooks suited to common-law induction reflects
a decline in the importance of this skill relative to other legal skills. I
do not attribute the demise of the Socratic Method to diminished
student tolerance for teaching techniques that hide the ball."5 The
common law itself is in decline. Codification has eroded the number
of fields where primary lawmaking results from common-law methods.
More and more, students must learn to take an authoritative text
(usually a statute or administrative regulation) and apply it to a
problem. 6 Divining the rule from cases remains useful, but not
central, to the practice most students will face. Anthony Kronman's
mourning for The Lost Lawyer" may reflect the passing of common-
law induction. Exposure to more cases might help students develop
the "good judgment" and "practical wisdom" Kronman misses."8 To
prepare students for practice today, however, teaching materials should
emphasize, not merely include, skills of statutory construction and
application.
Arguably, contract law is not the appropriate course in which to
introduce statutory application. The UCC has codified sales of goods,
but that subject frequently is covered in a specialized upper-class
course. The common law remains significant for most contracts in the
vast majority of states. Thus, focusing the class on common-law
techniques is a plausible choice.
In a traditional first-year curriculum, however, contracts affords
an excellent opportunity to introduce statutory techniques.19 Con-
tracts should not become exclusively devoted to statutory application
in the manner of, say, tax. But the UCC provides ample opportunities
to apply a statutory text. Even the Restatement, while not a statute,
provides rules that can be explored in the same way we explore
statutes. Neither torts nor property, other staples of the first year,
seems as well suited to the task. Until the curriculum adapts to
15. I do not mean to assert that asking students to think through problems for themselves
hides anything. But students may perceive it as such, particularly in this context, where the
American Law Institute has performed much of the induction in creating restatements of the law.
16. I am familiar with the contention that no text can ever be authoritative. But courts
often treat texts as authoritative. Students who will practice law, rather than teach it, must study
the techniques for using statutes to support their clients' positions, including, perhaps, the
techniques for deconstructing the text when their clients' fates so require.
17. ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1993); see Gail Heriot, Songs of Experience, 81 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1995).
18. KRONMAN, supra note 17, at 12.
19. Other courses, particularly Criminal Law, also can introduce statutory techniques. Civil
Procedure, once it gets past jurisdiction, is a likely candidate. On balance, however, first-year
courses are dominated by the common law. Introducing statutory techniques in a substantive,
private-law, civil-law course helps restore equilibrium to the curriculum.
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changes in modern practice, contracts professors should consider
helping students prepare for practice in a world of codes.
Sadly, many casebooks are caught in a pedagogical middle ground,
not well adapted either to common-law induction or to statutory
application. They fail to lay out the existing doctrine with sufficient
clarity to allow students to use that as a starting point for further
discussion.20 Nor do they contain enough case materials to permit a
meaningful development of inductive reasoning as practiced in the
common law. Rather than permitting a professor to use the materials
in either manner, these sources undermine each approach. The lack of
clarity forces a professor to devote some time to identifying the rule
before effort to apply it can begin. But the sparse materials preclude
a meaningful exercise in inductive reasoning. Thus, for all their
substantive merit, these materials suffer severe pedagogical disadvan-
tages.
Paradoxically, Barnett's casebook may facilitate common-law
induction better than many others. Barnett occasionally provides
several cases on the same doctrine. These units offer an opportunity
to practice the skills of common-law induction. One example has
already been mentioned: the extended material on the use of injunc-
tions to enforce personal service contracts. Interestingly, Barnett does
not include Section 367 of the Restatement in this section, leaving
ample room for deriving the rules from the cases. Another opportuni-
ty-my favorite for introducing this skill-arises when comparing Mills
v. Wyman"' to Webb v. McGowin 2 Here the Restatement, though
clear, may miss important distinctions between the cases. Thus,
Barnett's materials may offer sufficient opportunities to explore
common-law induction, though it may not satisfy a professor intent on
devoting the entire course to this skill.
Barnett's materials shine, however, when used as a springboard for
problems or for an exploration of the policies underlying the rules.
Barnett lets the professor choose which avenue to pursue. He does not
provide a series of problems in each section, nor (with some excep-
20. In an age of hornbooks and commercial outlines, omitting the rule entirely may merely
slow efforts to discover black letter rules, not prevent them. But impelling students toward
hornbooks does not teach useful legal research skills. The time students spend searching for and
reading rules omitted from the text would be more productively spent thinking about legal
problems to which the rule might be applied and how the problems should be resolved.
21. 3 Pick. 207 (Mass. 1825), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 7, at 688.
22. 168 So. 196 (Ala. App. 1935), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 7, at 697. Barnett
includes the opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court on denying certiorari in this case. 168 So.
199 (Ala. 1936).
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tions) does he offer extensive policy analysis in the text. I miss
problems or hypotheticals that would allow students to explore
variations before coming to class. But I find that gap easy to fill from
old exams. Note problems after each case would improve the text, but
perhaps not enough to justify added length. Given a choice between
note problems and sacrificing the depth of material presented in order
to make room for them, Barnett's choice is sound. I do not miss notes
exploring the policies underlying the rules. The Perspectives23
supplement provides ample opportunity to explore these topics.
Moreover, I find it useful to ask students to reason their way through
these issues.24 (While common-law induction is in decline, reasoned
policy analysis remains vital to arguing many appellate cases.) The
text provides the basic framework, facilitating elaboration in either or
both directions.
Do not misunderstand my praise of the casebook's fundamentals:
it is not devoid of theory or of problems. One entire chapter (entitled
"Principles of Enforceability") explores the theoretical basis for
enforcing promises, succinctly expounding decades of academic efforts
to rationalize the law's decisions about which promises to enforce. The
next three chapters follow up on these theories with cases that
exemplify their operation and allow students to see how each plays a
role in contract case law. Article excerpts at strategic points, while
primarily focused on placing cases in context, often inject theoretical
concerns into the reading.2" The cases themselves frequently discuss
the policy concerns in explaining the preference for one rule or result
over another.26 But compared to many other recent casebooks,
Barnett devotes more of the reading to cases, statutes, and sections of
the Restatement. He lays the foundation upon which classroom
discussion may build. The professor retains the freedom to design
whatever structure she desires upon this foundation.
23. BARNETT, PERSPECTIVES, supra note 11.
24. One of my colleagues prefers a text that includes policy analysis. He finds students
resist these topics unless the text introduces them. Endorsement by the author reduces the
tendency for students to dismiss the discussion as professorial digression. Between the
supplement and the sections in which Barnett plunges into policy concerns, the book establishes
from the outset that the study of law is not limited to memorizing rules. In particular, beginning
the book with a chapter covering public policy limits on freedom of contract should set a tone in
which conflicting policies play a prominent role in appellate decisionmaking.
25. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 7, at 858-66 (excerpts of articles by Barnett & Becker,
Gilmore, and Farnsworth on the role of reliance in the enforcement of promises).
26. See, e.g., Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th
Cir. 1988), reprinted in BARNETT, supra note 7, at 483-90.
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I find this absence of clutter a strong advantage of the case-
book.27 The book empowers professors. It allows them to determine
the direction the course will take. Many postmodern casebooks
constrain professors by proselytizing for a particular slant on contract
law. Others clutter the text with so many points of view (of uneven
worth) that they hamper efforts to help the class form a coherent
picture of contract law. Barnett's text will not preclude a professor
from adopting either approach. Proponents of the one true way or of
the value of every academic viewpoint can pursue those educational
ideals from this casebook. But selecting the Barnett casebook does not
dictate the choice. The value of these teaching materials remains
available to all, not just those who share a specialized view on contract
law.
The absence of clutter should not be confused with the absence
of insight. As with many casebook authors, Barnett illuminates
contract law via the organization of subjects and the choice of cases.
I was particularly impressed by the decision to group assent and
interpretation. The link between the questions "Did the parties
agree?" and "To what did the parties agree?" emerged effortlessly here,
elucidating both issues more effectively than usual.2" The author's
insight emerges quite clearly in his careful and extraordinarily thorough
exposition of the various bases for enforcing promises. The decision
to begin with remedies, though not unique, helps reveal the central role
played by the question "How should the law respond to this broken
promise?" Too many authors allow students to overlook the inextrica-
ble link between contracts and restitution.29
The flexibility of the materials permits professors to pursue
alternative organizations. I differ with Barnett in a number of
organizational decisions. I prefer to teach most contract defenses
27. "Absence" may be too strong a word. I could quibble with one or two of the excerpts
Barnett chose. But they are easy to skip without diminishing the overall wealth of material to
which students are exposed.
28. Barnett's is not the only casebook to juxtapose assent and interpretation. See, e.g., LON
L. FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW (6th ed. 1996); DAWSON ET AL.,
supra note S. Having not used either of these texts, my impression that Barnett makes the link
clearer may reflect greater familiarity with Barnett rather than any substantive difference between
the texts.
29. Even when the law decides a promise should not be enforceable (e.g., due to fraud),
remedies such as restitution may be available. Deciding not to enforce a promise does not equate
to denying a remedy, only to denying expectation-based recovery. If I may inject a word of
advice to beginning contract teachers: Start the course with remedies. When I started teaching
contracts, I did not follow this advice. I was absolutely certain that starting with remedies was
a bad idea. That was a mistake. I have seen the light.
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immediately after consideration.30 I prefer to teach excuses (impracti-
cability and frustration) in connection with performance and breach
(because these defenses do not affect the validity of the original
transaction, but only the obligation to continue performing). And I
prefer to teach assent after consideration, when options are easier for
students to understand.
Barnett's materials worked perfectly in the order I selected. The
units are sufficiently self-contained that they can be rearranged to suit
idiosyncratic preferences such as mine. Each unit begins and
progresses in a logical manner that does not dictate a particular
organization. Barnett has not eliminated the fundamental dilemma of
contract teaching: no matter where you start, students still need to
know something else before they can understand that unit. But Barnett
has not interwoven the units inextricably. Rather, they remain as
distinct as the subject permits.
III. CONCLUSION
Randy Barnett has prepared excellent pedagogical materials. The
casebook facilitates the valuable use of class time. The book's clarity
permits students to master much of the material before class, allowing
professors to devote their time to honing and elaborating on the basic
framework. The directions of elaboration are not dictated by any
political slant in the text. Rather, the clean presentation of fundamen-
tals leaves professors free to move classroom discussion in any direction
they desire. The wealth of material exceeds that of shorter casebooks
but remains surprisingly manageable within normal course constraints.
Professor Barnett has not cured the common cold or made legal
education an effortless task (for either students or professors). But he
has eliminated any need to struggle against a casebook's viewpoint or
its gaps. These materials permit professors and students to cooperate
in their joint enterprise: education.
30. Consideration rests on the inference that each party values what she will receive more
than what she will give in exchange for it. The law's decision not to question the adequacy of
consideration rests on the assumption that each person is capable of deciding for herself the value
of the things exchanged. Contract defenses explore the situations where that assumption may not
hold true. Juxtaposing them lends coherence to the study of consideration.
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